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Abstract 
Much literature on the topic of democratization in post 2003 Iraq claims that cultural 
factors  have impeded a process of effective and sustained democratic development in the 
country. In many instances however, these claims are very general and  fail to specify and 
theoretically defend how exactly, cultural facets relating to attitudes and behavior such as 
lacking religious tolerance, have functioned as variables conducive toward obstructing a 
process of democratization in the country. For the sake of specificity in terms of the 
correlation between culture and failed democracy in Iraq, the objective of this investigation 
has been to explore intolerance, or more specifically religious intolerance in Iraqi society 
since 2003 as found, and theoretically assess via theory of democratic political culture, its 
implications upon components of liberal democracy. This entailed three systematic stages 
facilitating theoretically grounded results. First, the identification of intolerance in Iraqi 
society via actions or behavior reflecting discrimination as a proxy indicator of the former. 
Second, an assessment of these findings in terms of their implications upon liberal democracy 
components. And lastly, subjection of democratic political culture theory to those liberal 
democracy implications observed and discussed in the prior stage. What was found, is Iraqi 
social intolerance to a greater or lesser extent acting as a variable conducive toward 
obstructing liberal democracy. This is illustrated by the direct negative implications and 
effects upon liberal democracy components, resulting from a prevalence of discrimination 
between Sunnis and Shia Muslims as both a product, and likewise a reflection of religious 
intolerance in Iraq. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The US´s “fight against terrorism” in Iraq, entailed two primary objectives 
toward ensuring, “..long-term safety and stability of our world” (Bush.W 2003 Feb). First, the 
elimination of tyranism and second, the establishment of democracy (Bush.W 2003 Feb, 
Nov). The logic being applied by the Bush´s administration, reflecting adherence to idealism 
and democratic peace theory,  was that a free Iraq with proper democratic institutions would 
in turn result in a more secure world. This implicitly implied that democracy could and would 
effectively function in the country given an absence of despotism and prevalence of proper 
democratic institutions.Accordingly, on March 20
th
 2003, the US invaded Iraq: Saddam was 
removed from power, the political system was dismantled, and the Iraqi military was 
disbanded. The U.S laid out a liberal democratic governing structure foundation. This 
included a model of, “..free and fair elections, accountable and transparent political 
institutions, preservation of civil and political rights, and support to civil society 
organizations”(Bridoux.2012: 330). In 2004, sovereignty is handed back over to the Iraqis and 
by 2006, a new Iraqi federal government and constitution based on separation of powers and 
equality, officially comes into effect (DFAT.2014). 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
 
Since Iraq’s government inception in 2006, the country has overall failed to 
reflect positive liberal democratic development. This, is reflected by both, Bartelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI) consecutively since 2006 rating Iraq’s general state of democracy 
low and likewise, by Freedom House´s (FH) ongoing rating of the country as not free in terms 
of liberty, freedom, and political rights. (BTI.2006-2014) (FH.2006-2014) 
 
Liberal democratic institutional changes in Iraq have not led to liberal 
democracy. As Bridoux 2012 argues, the institutional  liberal democratic model left behind by 
the US, has failed to address cultural factors such as religious conflict between Sunni and Shia 
Muslims, which are at the heart of Iraq’s ongoing social and political struggle (Bridoux.2012: 
330 343). Along these lines, Bridoux 2012 suggests that Iraq’s failure to attain liberal 
democracy, is attributed to the absence of a liberal democratization transition at the social 
level (Bridoux.2012: 329). This lack of social democratization as Basham 2005 early on 
warned, is argued to be attributed to Iraqi cultural factors related to lacking support and 
fostering of; democratic norms, values, and practices by the citizenry (Basham.2005:1,17).  
These claims, primarily derive from supposed implications upon liberal democracy of 
historically rooted deep state of religious conflict in Iraq, characterized by ongoing conflict 
between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Ottaway 2005 reflecting upon these divisions, made similar 
claims as Basham 2005; positing that democracy in the country would be dependent upon the 
populations ability to overcome coercive intolerant practices and harness consensus and 
toleration between the different religious groups that compose its society (Ottoway.2005:1,7). 
These three authors in other words on a very general level imply that contextual factors 
related to culture in Iraq, would go on to function as impediments toward the realization of 
liberal democracy in the country. This line of thought as Basham 2005 specifically argues, 
suggests on a wider theoretical level that supportive cultural values in Iraq such as social 
tolerance, are essential toward the long-term development and survival of democracy 
(Basham.2005:1).  
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In contesting Iraq’s lacking ability at attaining liberal democracy, pegged with 
claims suggesting cultural impediments to democracy in the country (including intolerance); 
this thesis thus seeks to explore intolerance in Iraq since 2003, and assess the implications of 
the latter upon liberal democracy components. Importantly, this investigation parts with a 
causal understanding of social tolerance or rather intolerance as a variable potentially 
attributed to Iraq’s incapacity to attain liberal democracy. 
This paper concludes by positing that in fact; religious intolerance identified in Iraq, is 
causally attributed to having acted to a greater or lesser extent, as a variable conducive toward 
obstructing liberal democracy.  
 
 
1.3 Research Question 
 
In what manner is social intolerance in Iraq since 2003 identifiable, and do findings suggest 
that intolerance has functioned as a variable negatively impacting liberal democracy 
components? 
 
 
1.4 Aim of paper 
 
To potentially shine light on the negative implications that cultural factors including 
intolerance in society, can have toward negatively impacting the fulfillment of a liberal form 
of democracy in a given context. 
 
1.5 Scope  
 
This investigation will assess intolerance in post US invasion Iraq (2003-2013) 
via  combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence which will then be subjected to 
liberal democracy components. Although Iraqi society is made up of varying religions and 
ethnicities in which more than one social conflict between groups can be identified, due to 
lack of space, this study will sole focus on the most predominant social conflict in post war 
Iraq concerning  Sunni and Shia Muslims. Intolerance between these groups will be assessed 
in the form of behavioural aspects broadly pertaining to both the political and social 
landscapes of society. 
As a disclaimer, i do not argue nor is it the focus of this paper to defend that intolerance in 
Iraq has ultimately impeded a process of liberal democratization. This paper does otherwise 
center around intolerance acting as a variable at least in part having obstructed components of 
liberal democracy in Iraq. 
 
1.6 Limitations 
 
To begin with, the potential of political/religious biases in sources of 
information used is a reality. In this regard, and considering primarily the incorporation of 
secondary source, some findings presented in the analysis may be distorted or inaccurate.  
Likewise and in some instances, lacking availability of quantitative data toward 
supporting/cross checking qualitative findings, may also be argued in some instances to put in 
question the legitimacy of some of the evidence presented. 
In addition, and although the investigation actively aims to adopt a neutral standpoint, an 
unconscious personal bias in the selection and interpretation of information is a realistic factor 
which may have impacted the assumptions made in this paper. 
  3 
2. Methods 
 
 
This investigation is in the form of a case study by where information has been 
collected by studying the characteristics of a particular “entity” (SP.2014:2), in this case  
being the country of Iraq post 2003. 
The case study incorporates a combination of both inductive and deductive methodology.  
Overall however, the methodological framework is deductive in nature as the investigation 
parts with a theoretical framework upon which then, findings are subjected to toward making 
theoretically supported assumptions.(James.2014). Within this overall deductive framework, 
induction is likewise applied as a means of guiding the type of information retrieved for 
analysis. (Bryman.2012.p26): Here and although actions reflecting discrimination is 
thematically predetermined for investigation as a variable addressing the theoretical 
framework applied, the research process nevertheless likewise parts quite widely in a 
qualitative fashion. In this regard, general observations inductively lead to the uncovering of 
facets addressing both; the predetermined theme and subsequently, the theoretical framework 
selected. (Bryman.2012.p26).  
The logic behind the partial incorporation of an inductive qualitative approach toward 
retrieval of information, is that it may and in fact has, allowed for findings in the empirical 
material to be identified and understood in a manner enabling the prompting of new insights. 
(Macdonald, Headlam. 2014:47).This insight might otherwise have been less explicit if the 
approach was completely deductive, resulting from the “narrow natured” (RMKB.2006) 
characteristics of the former. Nevertheless, the deductive ingredient in this investigation  
provided structure and guidance via the application of a theoretical framework  and a 
predetermined category of investigation which further, overall allowed for the study to remain 
on target toward addressing the research question at hand.(Liehr, Smith.2014:3) 
 
2.1 Outline and Analytical Approach  
 
The following in three stages and as this study was conducted, will outline more specifically 
how this investigation is carried out and will be presented. 
 
Stage 1: Findings 
 
Guiding theme for data collection 
 
As stated, this study aims to understand how social intolerance in Iraq has been 
manifested since 2003, and what impact findings have upon key components of liberal 
democracy. To facilitate this task and establish at least a minimal form of direction in the 
empirical material investigation process, behavioral aspects reflecting discrimination as a 
more concrete physical proxy indicator of lacking tolerance/intolerance, has been selected as a 
“guiding theme”, although nevertheless and as discussed, the investigation likewise parts 
broadly.  
As Cambridge Online defines, discrimination, relates to, “treating a person or particular group 
of people differently, especially in a worse way from the way in which you treat other people, 
because of their skin color, sexuality, etc”(C.O.2014). Discrimination here is thus resemblant 
of intolerance or intolerant attitude as it entails lacking acceptance of diversity via the unequal 
treatment of an individual or group on the basis of their skin color, sexuality or beliefs 
(Bergen.2012:113).  
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For the sake of abstaining from the argument of weather the egg came before the hen or vice 
versa, behavioral aspects suggesting discrimination will thus be logically interpreted as both 
reflecting, and likewise as a manifestation; of intolerance or intolerant attitudes.  
 
Type of Data 
 
Findings presented will be primarily in the form of qualitative and quantitative 
secondary source evidence. These derive from literary sources in the form of; academic 
articles, online articles, news media, NGO´S/INGO´s, United Nations documents, government 
documents, and democracy and freedom assessment organizations. Likewise, and as a 
primary source of information, an interview conducted with an Iraqi NGO has facilitated 
some qualitative evidence that will be presented in the study.  
 
This stage will accordingly present findings suggesting intolerance as reflected 
by the discriminating nature of aspects identified within Iraq’s broader conflict-characterized 
context. These findings will relate to both the political and social landscapes of Iraqi society. 
 
 
Stage 2: Interpretation of findings 
 
This stage of the investigation will aim to bridge data and theory by first, qualitatively 
interpreting findings (Macdonald, Headlam.2014:49), in terms of their impacts upon liberal 
democracy components. In other words, Intolerance in Iraqi society which will be reflected at 
this point by findings suggesting widespread discrimination in Iraq society, will be assessed in 
relation to impacting liberal democracy components.  
More specifically, the subjection of findings to liberal democracy components, will be done 
via a systematic comparison method by where comparisons will be made between; relative 
empirical information derived from cumulative findings, and predetermined components of 
liberal democracy which preliminarily, are suspected to become obstructed. (Alexander, 
Bennet.2005p1).  
These components adopted from Diamond (1999), Stanford (2014) and Rice (1997) include: 
 
 
 Freedoms  of; “expression, belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, and assembly.” 
(Diamond 1999:11).  
 
 Equal access to education and employment as political resources. (Stanford 2014). 
 
 Presence of a Civic culture (Rice.1997:100)(Stanford 2014). 
 
 Absence of reserved domains of power (Diamond 1999:10,11). 
 
 State decisions and control determined by elected accountable officials (Diamond 
1999:10,11). 
 
 Constrained executive power via horizontal accountability and autonomous power of 
government institutions including the judiciary and parliament (Diamond 1999:10,11). 
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 Equal access to the political process regardless of race ethnicity or religion. (Not prohibited 
from expressing interests and participating in the political process)(Diamond 1999:10,11). 
 
 
Stage 3: Concluding theoretical implications 
 
Observations made in the prior stage regarding the negative impact of 
intolerance in the form of discrimination upon liberal democracy components, will in this 
section be subjected to the overall cause-effect logic defended by theory of democratic 
political culture. This will be the final stage toward attaining theoretically supported core 
assumptions that address the research question earlier stated. 
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3. Theory 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
The overall argument that leads this study, relates to Diamond (1999) positing 
that tolerance in society, forms an indispensable ingredient of liberal democracy 
(Diamond.1999:166,173). Here it is otherwise assumed that a rather lack of tolerance or 
intolerance may obstruct the fulfillment or attainment of liberal democracy (Diamond 
1999:166,173). Theoretically grounded, this argument adopts a standpoint denominated as 
democratic political culture.  
This theoretical framework selection has been motivated by the direct correlation of theory 
selected with arguments made by the three authors earlier listed. This generally; entails claims 
pointing in the direction of correlation between culture and democracy by where the former in 
Iraq is argued to have acted as a variable obstructing democracy. The following will 
accordingly review theory of democratic political culture and discuss the role of tolerance or 
intolerance as a core component of the former.  
3.2 Conceptualizing Theory of Political Culture 
The concept of political culture has come to be theoretically applied as a means 
toward understanding and assessing the emergence and development of democracy: 
Democratic political culture theory, challenging institutionalism by where democracy is 
argued to develop given only presence of efficient democratic institutions, assumes that 
cultural aspects, in addition act as important variables toward the development and 
sustainability of democracy (Benavides.2011:11). The modern conception of this theory 
pioneered by Almond and Verba in 1963, posits that democracy and its effective and 
sustained functioning; is dependant not only on proper democratic institutions, but likewise 
on the degree to which its subject population and elite class possess and adhere to specific 
democratic norms and behavior patterns(Almond,Verba.1963) (Tessler,Gao.2009:197).  
At its core, democratic political culture theory assumes a casual approach to 
mass and elite attitudes as conditioning behavior which further are argued to determine 
political performance and structure in society (Diamond.1999:163) This does not however, 
assume a full on causal deterministic approach to the understanding of political cultures 
impact by where the latter has a sole one way determining effect upon political structure and 
performance. Causality here as Diamond draws form Gabriel Almond, in fact works both 
ways: Political culture influences structure and behavior but likewise, structure and 
performance is also believed to have an impact on political culture (Diamond.1999:164).  
Elements or rather variables that make up a democratic political culture revolve 
around categories reflecting norms and values which address; consensus, equal integration, 
and perceptions toward higher authority. These include; interpersonal trust, social tolerance, 
peaceful resolution of conflict via compromise, and acceptance of democratic institutions as 
legitimate (Parrot.1997:21 in Blokker.2008:163). Within this political culture framework, this 
thesis will only focus on tolerance as a variable addressing democracy. The following will 
accordingly discuss Social tolerance/intolerance and its relation to liberal democracy. 
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3.3 Social Tolerance/Intolerance 
Social tolerance according to its neo-classical understanding, entails peoples 
acceptance of diverging views and beliefs (Bergen.2012:113). A tolerant society as Green & 
Gurevich (2001) describes reflects; recognition and acceptance on equal terms, of the identity 
and uniqueness of different members or groups of society with diverging views and/or beliefs.  
 
Tolerance, is argued by theory of democratic political culture as a crucial 
variable for the effective functioning and development of democracy. In terms of liberal 
democracy, and considering it centers around upholding individual liberty and equality in 
society, it may thus be argued to require a citizenry which respects diversity (GarciaRiveraet 
al.2002 in Tessler&Gao.2009.p199). Tolerance is considered indispensable here for two main 
reasons: First, liberal democracy places emphasis on equal treatment and inclusion in society 
of all citizens regardless of views or beliefs (Diamond.1999:10,11)(Tessler.Gao.2009.p199). 
For this to become legitimate, individuals must first accept and respect that all people are 
equally entitled access to resources regardless of a persons or groups views and beliefs 
(Tessler.Gao.2009.p199). Second, tolerance toward opposing viewpoints and beliefs is 
essential for enabling political contestation and open exchange of ideas, which is an important 
component of liberal democracy (Tessler.Gao.2009.p199). In this regard, lacking respect 
toward the right to freely express, impedes the important role in a democracy of citizens to 
advocate their needs and concerns, and further to hold leaders and government accountable 
(Tessler.Gao.2009.p199). 
In short, as liberal democracy entails respect for diversity and equal opportunity and inclusion 
into the political process of citizens, it is thus defended here to require tolerance as; equal 
legal and political rights and likewise, as mass social orientation which recognizes, accepts, 
and respects; the identity, beliefs, and uniqueness of different factions of the population, as 
equal (Green&Gurevich.2001:208). Toward liberal democracy, tolerance must hence not only 
be reflected constitutionally, but likewise also in practice via moral adherence to the concept 
of; equal rights, and inclusion regardless of individual or group preferences. 
This rhetoric as part of democratic political culture theory, otherwise assumes, that an 
otherwise lack of tolerance or intolerance, is causally attributed to impeding or negatively 
impacting a liberal conception of democracy. As Green & Gurevich (2001) note, without 
tolerance for differing ideas where equal representation and popular interest is suppressed, the 
chances of  liberal democracy survival becomes diminished. This is attributed to the potential 
in surfacing; of inequality resulting from intolerance which further as Tessler & Gao (2009) 
describe, increases the risk in outbreak of violence, conflict, and civil war 
(Tessler&Gao.2009:199).  
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4. Findings 
 
 
4.1 Contextual Observations 
 
Iraq for hundreds of years has suffered from ongoing historically rooted conflict 
concerning a religious hierarchy power struggle between Shia and Sunni Muslims. This 
conflict derives from succession controversy following the death of prophet Muhammad in 
632 A.D which since then, has manifested itself with ongoing periods of discrimination and 
oppression between the two groups (Berzegar.2011). 
 In recent times, this divide has been sharply accentuated following the most recent U.S 
intervention. Decades of Sunni rule and oppression against Shias during the Hussein era, 
abruptly came to an end in 2003 with the countries invasion and dismantling of its political 
system. A subsequent political power vacuum enabled following the collapse of Saddams 
regime, pegged with a democratic institutional structure  left behind by the U.S has, as 
Basham (2004) early on warned; given the  Shia Muslims majority in Iraq; an opportunity to 
rise over Sunnis, dominate the country, and exact revenge against past wrongdoings (Basham 
2004:10). Although bold claims, along these lines what has been witnessed in Iraq since 2003, 
is the near complete transfer of political power toward Shias and away from Sunnis. This 
power acquisition has been regarded by Iraqi opposition and the international community, as 
illegitimate and focused at alienating Sunnis from Iraqi society (F.H.2014) (BTI.2013). This 
has in effect had profound impacts outside the political landscape, which in great part is 
responsible for causally fueling Iraq’s internal violent conflict (Councilman.2013)(U.N.2013). 
In the Sunni community in this regard, it has sparked acts of violent retribution against Shias 
which has in turn, provoked a similar response by the latter toward the former. More broadly 
and according to Councilman 2013, this tradeoff, has since 2003; fueled vicious patterns of 
hostility between the groups. This has resulted in the deepening of Sunni-Shia religious 
divisions and reinforcement of extremist polarization and discrimination in Iraqi society 
(Councilman.2013). 
These broad contextual findings point in the direction of religious intolerance in 
Iraq. Toward understanding the potential impact that intolerance may have upon liberal 
democracy in Iraq, the following and guided by the above, will proceed with a more in-depth 
look at findings suggesting violent tradeoff between Sunnis and Shias, as a reflection of 
discrimination. 
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4.2 Sectarian Violence 
 
Religiously motivated violence between Sunnis and Shias found, reflects 
discrimination in Iraqi society perhaps most evidently and adversely. Violence primarily 
between these two groups is reflected in graph X below indicating deaths resulting from acts 
of terror in the country between 2003 and 2013. 
 
Graph 1 
High casualty terrorist bombings  
(WRSC.2014) 
 
 
Illustrated here is the emergence of worrying trends in deaths resulting from violent acts of 
terror  following U.S intervention in 2003.These attacks have been sectarian in nature and 
primarily in the form of bombings targeting general populations and individuals in places 
including; mosques, schools, government buildings, crowded city locations, and 
transportation systems (HP.2014).  
 
Interpreting the numbers: Factors motivating sectarian violence and extremism 
 
Oppression between Sunnis and Shias has progressively deepened religious 
divisions and intolerance in Iraq since 2003 (Councilman 2013). Feelings of of hatred, 
revenge, and paranoia, continuously fueled by acts of hostility, have negatively conditioned 
the relationship between these two Muslim factions(Councilman 2013): As Ruhayem (2012) 
describes, Iraq “.. is a world in which people see enemies everywhere, and sectarian identity 
determines how they think”. Sectarian hostility targeting general populations according to 
Councilman (2013), has become a standardized means by which sects belonging to these two 
Muslim factions respond to threats and attacks between each other (Councilman.2013).  
As Codesman and Kahzai (2013) note, this tradeoff has been enabled and continuously 
reinforced by ongoing acts of violent hostility between the groups resulting in further violence 
and ongoing deepening of divisions (Cordesman&Khazai 2013:5). More specifically and as 
IFRAD similarly describes, sectarian violence has had the effect since 2003 in motivating; 
expansion in number and size of Sunni and Shia extremist groups, extremist polarization of 
previously peaceful grass-root movements and organizations and subsequently, ongoing 
patterns of sectarian violence (IRFAD.2014). 
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Along these lines and as Minority Rights and Councilman (2013) describe, retribution 
between sects has been a major driver in the perpetuation of sectarianism and violence in Iraq 
(M.R.2008) (Councilman.2013). 
This may be argued to be reflected in the graph above by subsequent high death rates 
following instances of  sudden sharp spikes in graph above:  The first upsurge as BBC 
describes, is attributed to the bombing by Sunni militias in February of 2006 of a Shia shrine 
in Samarra resulting in the deaths of hundreds (BBC.1 May.2014). This event is regarded as 
responsible for unleashing a strong wave of perpetual attacks between the groups (refer to 
graph X), resulting in further deepening of the Shia-Sunni hatred divide (BBC.1
st
.May.2014). 
This is reflected on a rather short term basis, with the months of May and June that followed 
which on average experienced more than 100 sectarian violence related deaths per day in the 
country (BBC.1
st
.May.2014). 
Secondly, the other upsurge in 2013, is attributed to being a sectarian response to the 
government ordered storming by security forces, of a peaceful Sunni protest camp earlier that 
year in Kirkuk (HRW.2014). As in 2006, this event reflecting government driven 
discrimination against Sunnis as will later be covered, is according to Dunlop (2014) and 
reflected in the graph above, in great part responsible for triggering the last major upsurge of 
sectarian violence in the country (Dunlop.2014).These observations illustrate and suggest the 
adverse reinforcing effect that sectarian attacks have had in motivating sectarian sentiment 
and retribution in the form violence between both Sunnis and Shias. 
 
As Codesman and Kahzai (2013) describe, the impact that this conflict is having 
in terms of displacing populations, is also an important component reinforcing sectarian 
sentiment and fueling violence. (Codesman and Kahzai.2013:12). These effects further 
illustrate the extent of, and adverse effects of sectarian hostility in Iraq since 2003: City 
districts are no longer of mixed Sunni-Shia composition  resulting from sectarian violence 
(AP.2012) (BC.2014).This is most prominently demographically illustrated in  Figures 1and 2 
regarding  Baghdad, in which profound religious distributional changes are reflected in the 
city between 2003 and 2009. What is observable, is the diminishment of religiously mixed 
neighborhoods which as Thurber (2011) describes have become homogenized on the basis of 
sectarian identity (Thurber 2011:1). 
 
Figure 1Ethnic Religious Neighborhoods in Metropolitan Baghdad. 2003(Lzady.2003)
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Figure 2 
Ethnic Religious Neighborhoods in Metropolitan Baghdad. 2009 
(Lzady.2009) 
 
 
 
Aside from sectarian violence, conflict deriving from the political landscape as 
Codesman and Kahzai (2013) and councilman (2013) describe, has likewise been an 
important ingredient fueling sectarianism and violence (Codesman and Kahzai.2013:14,15). 
The uncovering of this facet will hence be covered later however, it is important to note here 
as it is the second core factor found, attributed to the rise and perpetuation of sectarianism and 
discrimination in the form of religiously based  violence in the country: In this regard, a crisis 
at the political level by which the executive has been regarded as concentrating power away 
from Sunnis, likewise reflecting discrimination as will later be reviewed, has been found to be 
a prominent source from which violence in the country has likewise been motivated and 
perpetuated (F.H.2014) (Codesman and Kahzai.2013:12).   
 
The evidence above enables a chain of events to be assembled, illustrating in a 
holistic manner, both the dynamics of discrimination in the form of sectarian violence in Iraq, 
and likewise the overall cause-effect nature of Iraq’s religious conflict since 2003.  
This is illustrated in figure X below. What is observed; are Sunni sects carrying out attacks 
against the general Shia population in protest to government actions. These attacks and 
subsequent indirect effects, have in turn motivated retributive attacks by part of Shia extremist 
groups which likewise and further, have been condemned and similarly responded by Sunnis. 
(Concilman.2013) (F.H.2014) (M.R.2008) 
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4.3 Obstruction of Peaceful Protest 
 
Findings have been presented which reflect discrimination in the extreme form 
of sectarian violence. Alongside sectarian violence as a means of condemnation, there has 
likewise been peaceful organized attempts to protest in Iraq. On many occasions however, 
these attempts have violently obstructed resulting from government and Shia gang 
intervention. 
Since 2011 more specifically, there has been a surfacing of peaceful Sunni demonstrations 
across Iraq with attendance rates in the hundreds of thousands (UN.2013:3). These protests 
have primarily been motivated by discontent over government policies and functioning 
including discrimination in state employment, and with financial, administrative and legal 
corruption as will accordingly be reviewed (UN.2013:3). Since 2012 however, peaceful Sunni 
demonstrators have been subject of severe acts of discrimination: 
 Although guarded by Iraq’s new constitution, in practice and according to findings, freedom 
of assembly has been obstructed both by government and organized pro government Shia 
gangs. As an anonymous NGO staff member from IRFAD Iraq I interviewed asserted, “…the 
Shia government oppresses Sunni protesters. They come out and do peaceful protests.. they 
try to do this, but no way they can because of Shia government” (IRFAD.2014). As GICJ 
(2013) similarly describes, peaceful demonstrators have experienced threats and violence by 
part of the Iraqi government. The hostile environment for peaceful demonstrators is verbally 
reflected here by Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki on the 18
th
 of August of 2013 where he 
promised to end demonstrations against the political process (GICJ.2013). General of land 
forces Ali Ghaidan similarly affirmed that year that he was determined and authorized to take 
action against all protesters (GICJ.2013).  
Hostile promises have been accompanied by violent attacks by government forces against 
peaceful Sunni protesters (IRFAD 2014). One of many events in this regard was the deadly 
raid by security forces in April of 2013 on a Sunni peaceful protest camp near Kirkuk (HRW 
2013). According to HRW (2013), security forces attacked demonstrators without 
provocation, leaving dozens dead and many injured (HRW.2013).  
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There have been many more cases like this which have resulted in Sunni 
peaceful protester  attacks and deaths in cities including Falluja, Anbar, Salah ah Din, Diyala, 
Ninewa, Ramadi and Baghdad (IRFAD.2014)(HRW.2014). 
Violent oppression against peaceful Sunni protesters is also evident by part of Shia pro 
government groups. On June 10
th 
and February 25
th
 of 2011 in Baghdad, pro government Shia 
gangs armed with weapons beat and stabbed peaceful Sunni demonstrators and sexually 
assaulted various women (HRW.2011). Security forces, whose role should be to defend the 
populace against such acts of violent hostility, have purportedly been standing by as 
aggressors carry on their attack on unarmed protestors (HRW.2011). Based on testimonies, 
HRW further notes that these attacks have had a profound effect in ability to exercise right to 
peaceful assembly and protest, and have in addition had substantial psychological impacts 
(HRW.2011). In fear of attack, and based on testimonies from organizers, many protesters 
have as a result stopped attending peaceful demonstrations as a result (HRW.2011).
 
 
 
4.4  Discrimination In Education 
 
Discrimination is also reflected in other sectors of Iraq’s public sphere. As 
Councilman (2013) notes, religious discrimination has impacted nearly all aspects of life 
including education and employment. 
 
Higher education in Iraq has been found to have significantly suffered from 
religious divisions since 2003. Findings suggest that Iraqi universities have been subject to 
severe acts of discrimination resulting from academic venue divisions along sectarian lines 
(GCPEA.2013:21). As Freedom House (2013) notes, universities operate in, “highly 
politicized and insecure environments” (F.H.2013).  
Deterioration of religious coexistence in Iraqi society as illustrated earlier, has likewise and 
similarly, negatively impacted universities. This has ultimately had the effect of displacing 
Sunni students from universities located in Shia areas, and vice versa (Cancela-Kieffer 2007 
in Paanakker.2009:33). Student displacement here, has been found to be attributed to two 
main factors with strong religious intolerance/discrimination undertones.  
First, according to Sawahell (2012), institutions across the country have fallen under control 
of Sunni and Shia sects depending on the region in which they are located (Sawahel.2012). 
Control over universities has also in many cases been transferred to Shia political parties such 
as; Supreme Council in Iraq controlling Baghdad university, Sadr group controlling Al-
Mustansiriya university, and the Al-Dawa Party controlling Al-Nahrain University (Sawahel 
2012). Sectarian control over these institutions according to Sawahell (2012), has been 
accompanied by administrative discrimination which include admission requirements and 
scholarship approvals based on sectarian affiliation (Sawahel 2012). In addition, and as 
Mamouri 2014 describes, sectarian control of institutions has in effect and in many cases,  
resulted in curricular content manipulation (Mamouri.2014). As Jawad (2007) notes, 
curriculums in universities across the nation have been modified to accommodate particular 
sectarian beliefs (Jawad.2007:522 in Paanakker.2009:33). 
 The second factor relates to violence targeting higher education institutions.  This includes 
31,598 violent sectarian attacks against students and staff that have occurred since 2003 as a 
result of religious polarization and division in higher education (Sawahel.2012). Included here 
are the deaths of nearly 500 academics between 2003 and 2006(Hodges.2006). 
The subsequent effects of sectarian attacks on students and professors and administrative 
policies which reflect discrimination on the basis of sectarian affiliation, has ultimately led to 
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drastic changes in religious composition of universities across Iraq (Sawahel.2012) and , has 
forced many students to relocate due to lacking security (Ajeeli.2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Discrimination in Employment 
 
Discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation has also been found reflected 
in the statal employment sector. Evidence is reflected shortly after the U.S invasion where 
systematic firing of Sunni employees from state institutions was carried out on the basis of 
direct or suspected connection to the previous Sunni Baath party (FH.2014). Since then, these 
individuals have been unable to obtain state employment as a further result of sectarian 
favoritism in hiring; especially severe within state bodies including the military and police 
forces as well as in the political sphere which will later be covered(FH.2014) (USDS.2010:8). 
Shias on the other hand according to I.O (2013), have been actively recruited and employed 
by state security bodies (I.O.2013). In effect, tens of thousands of Sunnis have subsequently 
lost their jobs since 2003 (I.O.2013). 
The higher education system has also been hit hard with employment discrimination. 
Implementation of sectarian agendas by part of education minister Ali-Al Adeeb as also part 
of the de-Baathification scheme, have successfully purged many Sunni´s from educational 
institutions (AP.2012). In addition and resulting from the sectarian control and polarization of 
universities as previously discussed, has been the hiring of staff on the basis of religious 
affiliations (Sawahel.2012). As an anonymous Iraqi university professor interviewed in 2012 
alleged, Shia religious orientation “has become an exclusive passport for anyone to assume 
any high position” (Anonymous 2012 in Sawahel 2012). Academic, scientific, and 
administrative positions according to Sawahel (2012) have since 2003 not been determined by 
level of expertise, but rather by sectarian afiliation (Sawahel.2012). 
 
 
 
4.6 Inequality in the political landscape 
 
Former president of the Iraq National Group, Laith Kubba, early on warned that 
sudden introduction of democratic reform in an Iraq composed of multiple competing 
religious/sectarian groups, would jeopardize democracy resulting from conflict arising from 
the institutionalization of politics along religious/sectarian lines (Kubba.2003. In 
Basham.2004.p11). In accordance with Kubbas claim and overall, Iraq’s political system has 
since democratic reform, been dominated by ongoing conflict and deadlock  resulting from 
power struggles deriving from competing agendas centered around paroqial sectarian 
interests. (F.H.2014) (BTI 2014:13).  
This crisis since the new governments inception in 2005 according to HRW (2014) and BTI 
(2014), has been notoriously known for the controversial political actions of the ongoing  
governing Da´wa Shia party (executive) headed by current prime minister Nouri al-Maliki 
(BTI.2014:13) (HRW.2014). The ruling cabinet has been strongly accused of corruption and 
undemocratic practices which have increasingly come to be regarded as sectarian and 
authoritarian moves toward politically marginalizing Sunnis (HRW.2014) (BTI 2014:27-28). 
It is primarily these actions, that Freedom House attributes to a rise among the population of; 
political distrust, violence, and deepening of religious division in Iraqi society (F.H.2014).  
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In line with the above, the following will present findings which  
reflect  religious discrimination in the political landscape  by part of Maliki and his cabinet 
since 2005. 
 
Bartelsmann Transformation Index and the Institute for the Study of War 
provide evidence which reflects a series of non tolerant actions by part of the government 
since 2006. First, this includes accusations of centralizing power by placing under  direct 
control (bypassing parliament) key independent government bodies via replacement of 
opponent Sunni heads of agencies (BTI.2014:13). As ISW (2013) notes, this includes Maliki 
taking  advantage of a lack of oversight on military appointments to directly as opposed to 
parliament, replace senior military officers with other members of Shia religious orientation. 
In addition and similarly, this also includes the targeting and replacement of senior Sunni 
officials from the central bank, integrity commission, national police, and high electoral 
commission (ISW.2013)(BTI.2014:13). These parliamentary bypassed and Sunni biased 
replacements according to ISW (2013) have enabled Maliki to greatly influence the 
functioning of these bodies and has further allowed him to “check his political opponents and 
protect his political allies” (ISW 2013). Second and similarly, Maliki according to BTI (2014) 
has gone to the extent of creating extra constitutional  bodies that are only accountable to the 
prime minister which again, bypass parliament, and further have no legal framework and 
hence no oversight or accountability (BTI.2014:6). As ISW (2013) describes, these security 
bodies such as the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC), have allowed Maliki to 
bypass the defense and interior ministries and establish an informal chain of command that 
reaches military and police commanders on the ground (ISW.2013). According to ISW (2013) 
the OCINC has allowed  Maliki and his party to assert direct influence over both “.. the 
targeting of individuals and the conduct of operations” for political purposes (ISW.2013). 
Thirdly and facilitated by the centralization of power via creation and control of government 
bodies, has been, according to ISW (2013), the ongoing selective targeting and purging of 
Sunni politicians by Maliki since 2007 (ISW.2013). This includes previous vice president 
Tariq alHashimi and finance minister Rafi al-Issawi among others, on unjustified charges of 
terrorism (BTI.2014:2).  
 
These findings, clearly reflecting targeted Sunni discrimination in the political 
landscape, has fueled Iraq’s political crisis and deadlock and has furthers led to accusations 
by the opposition of unconstitutional behavior and the presidents breaching of power sharing 
agreements (BTI.2014:13,14). These “autocratic actions” according to BTI (2014) have been 
enabled by Maliki; “evoking the specter of a Baathist threat”, as a political instrument to 
justify the sidelining and persecution of Sunni political members which further has been 
facilitated by the establishment of illegitimate chains of command 
(BTI.2014:13,6)(ISW.2013). In all, findings suggest that the Da´wa party have been accused 
of unconstitutionally molding the political and legal structure of government institutions in 
successful attempts at ensuring Shia dominance in the political landscape. These autocratic 
tendencies have ultimately and effectively eroded the constitutionally intended ability of 
parliament to exercise oversight over executive action (ISW.2013). In effect, this has 
undermined the interests and obstructed the ability for Sunnis in Iraq to become fully 
represented and absorbed into the political process(BTI.2014:13). 
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5. Discussion: Liberal Democracy Implications 
 
The findings presented above overall illustrate a deep state of social intolerance. 
This is reflected by the nature and extent of religious discrimination found between Shia and 
Sunni Muslims in Iraqi society since 2003. 
Contesting theory of democratic political cultures assertion in that tolerance in society is 
essential for democracy; the following will now hence systematically discuss findings in 
relation to their implications upon components of liberal democracy. 
 
 
5.1 Implications: Sectarian Violence 
 
Findings regarding the violent sectarian relation between Sunnis and Shias may 
be argued to have negative implications upon liberal democracies component calling for the 
presence of a civic culture.  
 
Findings initially presented suggested that Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraqi 
society since 2003 have been deeply divided along sectarian lines. These divisions were 
initially quantitatively found to be manifested via acts of terror resulting in deaths. 
Qualitatively, sectarian violence identified was found here to have not only been a product of 
the  Sunni-Shia religious divide but  likewise, findings suggested that it has been  a factor 
which has also been responsible for fueling expansion of sectarian extremism and furthering 
sectarian violence(IRFAD.2014) (Codesman and Kahzai.2013:14,15).  
Findings likewise suggested that sectarian violence has been additionally perpetuated and 
deepened between these groups resulting from other factors including population 
displacement as an indirect effect of the former, and also as a response to conflict at the 
political level. 
 
What has been observed from this evidence,  is not only the manifestation of 
ongoing religious intolerance as manifested via sectarian violence but likewise and also 
important, the role which violence in itself and other factors have had in motivating and 
perpetuating this hostile conflict. What this evidence further and importantly reflects, which  
likewise has been fueled by the above, is adherence to feelings of revenge and condemnation 
between Sunnis and Shias, as opposed to compromise and consensus (Councilman.2013). 
This aspect, reflected by evidence as what seems like a psychological normalization of 
violence as a response to threats and attacks, has according to IFRAD (2014) and Codesman 
& Kahzai (2013) had adverse effects upon perpetuating a deterioration of relations between 
the two Muslim groups(IRFAD.2014)(Codesman and Kahzai.2013:5).  
In comparing these findings to an understanding of a liberal civic culture, a set of conclusions 
may be drawn. A civic culture entails; tolerance for diversity and social cohesion, as well as 
networks of cooperation and social engagement(Rice.1997:100). 
 
To begin with,  sectarian violence as a manifestation and likewise a reflection of 
intolerance, has in itself explicit negative implications upon the first two components of civic 
culture: A single or handful of sectarian acts of violence may be argued to reflect intolerance 
and lacking of social cohesion. It is however rather the identification of the widespread extent 
of sectarian violence in Iraq, which allows for a broader perhaps more significant assumption 
to be made in relation to impacting these civic culture components. In this regard, quantitative 
evidence depicting ongoing trends between 2003 and 2013 in deaths resulting from violent 
attacks pegged with adverse side effects in terms of having been responsible for the 
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homogenization of communities along sectarian lines, illustrates the widespread extent of, and 
pervasiveness of sectarian violence in Iraq.  Widespread sectarian violence in Iraq in other 
words, reflects intolerance and lacking of general social cohesion. Intolerance in the form of 
sectarian violence and in itself, is thus attributed to directly reflect an obstruction of tolerance 
for diversity and solidarity as otherwise called upon by a liberal civic culture. 
 
Likewise, findings also negatively address civic engagement and cooperation 
components of civic culture. Sectarianism and violence resemble a form of civic cooperation 
and engagement that is not in accordance with that called upon by a liberal civic culture: A 
liberal civic culture, otherwise and ideally calls for networks of cooperation which actively 
and peacefully engage in society to promote concerns and needs toward the benefit of the 
broader community (Rice.1997:100).  In comparison, sectarian networks of cooperation 
engaging in violence reflect; neither peaceful engagement nor promotion of the needs of the 
broader community. What is otherwise reflected here, are networks of cooperation divided 
along extremist religious lines which have been engaging in hostile actions against the general 
Shia and Sunni populations toward the promotion of diverging sectarian agendas driven by 
hatred and condemnation (Councilman.2013)(Ruhayem.2012).  
 
What is additionally and importantly identifiable, is that  sectarian violence in 
itself as well as the indirect effect of displacing populations, and likewise resulting from 
conflict reflecting discrimination in the political landscape; have further been found as 
conducive toward the expansion and perpetuation  of sectarianism and violence. 
(Cordesman&Khazai2013)(IRFAD.2014). What this implicitly suggests on a broader level 
and to a greater or lesser extent, is that acts of intolerance (sectarian violence and 
discrimination in the political landscape) have served as variables which have been 
responsible for shaping cooperation and engagement in a manner opposing that called upon 
by a liberal democratic civic culture. This is reflected by qualitative findings suggesting the 
adverse effect that acts of discrimination between Sunnis and Shias have had in reinforcing 
and expanding extremism and  motivating feelings of hatred and revenge between Sunnis and 
Shias and additionally quantitatively, as reflected by periods of intense acts of terror 
following major attacks including both in 2006 and 2013. Sectarian violence and 
discrimination at the political level as a manifestation and likewise reflection of intolerance in 
Iraq, is thus attributed to in the longer run at least in part responsible for having further 
reinforced and deepened intolerance. The nature or manner in which this intolerance 
reinforcement has been suggested to have been manifested (via sectarian expansion and 
violence), is argued to hence on a longer term basis; have negatively impacted the 
development of a civic culture in terms of adversely effecting to a greater or lesser extent; 
cooperation and engagement. 
 
In short, these assumptions; imply that sectarian violence, as a manifestation and 
likewise reflection of intolerance, is resemblant of components of a liberal civic culture in an 
adverse manner. Further, sectarian violence in itself and other factors, also as manifestations 
of intolerance effects, have been argued to have negatively reinforced cooperation and 
engagement and hence to a greater or lesser extent the development of a civic culture away 
from that called upon by liberal democracy. Intolerance is thus argued to have had to greater 
or lesser extent, negative implications upon a civic culture as called upon by liberal 
democracy. 
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5.2 Implications: Obstruction of Peaceful Protest 
 
Although negative effects of intolerance in the form of sectarian violence upon 
liberal democratic civic culture have been identified, this is not to assume that the former has 
fully negatively conditioned Iraq’s society in a hostility based cooperative manner. Findings 
have shown, that in fact there has likewise been many instances of protests characterized by 
organized social structures of cooperation promoting peaceful civic engagement. This is 
reflected by Sunni non-violent protests which have surfaced in many regions of the country 
since 2011. This has been in response to discrimination in state employment, and to financial, 
administrative and legal corruption (UN.2013:3). Unfortunately however, these peaceful 
Sunni protests have become violently targeted by government and pro-government Shia 
affiliated gangs. This is perhaps most evidently reflected by Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki 
verbally and directly condemning on the 18
th
 of August 2013, demonstrations of any kind 
opposing the political process (GICJ.2013). A follow through of these threats has come about, 
with many instances of government led violent oppression, prominently reflected in April of 
2013 with the deadly raiding by security forces of a peaceful Sunni protest camp in the city of 
Kirkuk (HRW.2013). Likewise, peaceful protestors have also been subject to violent hostility 
by part of Shia pro government gangs including in Baghdad on the 10
th
 of June and 25
th
 of 
February of 2011 where Sunni protesters were sexually assaulted, stabbed, and 
beaten.(HRW.2013) 
 
Discrimination and intolerance reflected by these actions, has profound 
implications upon democracy. Liberal democracy crucially calls for freedom of belief, 
opinion, assembly, and demonstration and likewise, access on equal basis to the political 
process regardless of race, ethnicity, or religion (Diamond.1999:11). In such a state, citizens 
are able to protest and organize toward influencing the political process and hold government 
accountable in a manner free from persecution or legal constraints (Diamond.1999:11).  
 Legally in Iraq, these aspects are guarded under article fourteen of the countries new 
constitution (I.C.2005). In practice however, and given the findings above, these important 
components forming an essential pillar of liberal democracy, have been overtly disregarded 
and further compromised by actions of government and organized Shia gangs. Verbal and 
violent hostile actions reflect intolerance toward inclusion of Sunnis in the political process 
via violent obstruction of freedom of speech and demonstration. Evidence of this comes both 
in the form of direct verbal hostility whereby the Prime Minister and General of land forces 
Ali Ghaidan have publicly threatened those opposing the political process (GICJ 2013) and 
likewise, by an array of incidences involving violent assault upon peaceful Sunni protestors 
(HRW.2013) (UN.2013). Subsequently and further, adverse physical and psychological 
effects of these actions are reflected as HRW 2011describes; by a decrease in those attending 
peaceful Sunni protests, in fear of attack (HRW.2011).  
As touched upon, what these hostile actions in themselves further and directly imply, is not 
only attitudes toward, but likewise and in effect, an actual “physical” suppression of Sunni 
liberal freedoms including expression and demonstration and likewise and subsequently, an 
obstruction in the ability for other interest groups to take part and influence the political 
process.  
 
In line with the focus of this paper, what is hence more broadly observable here, 
is that religious intolerance as manifested via verbal and violent hostility targeting peaceful 
Sunni protestors, implies an obstruction to liberal  democracy components related to freedoms 
of; belief, opinion, assembly, and demonstration and likewise, access on equal basis to the 
political process. This argument is drawn from the explicit intolerant nature and subsequent 
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implications upon liberal democracy components, of actions by government and Shia gangs 
entailing verbal and violent hostility against peaceful Sunni opposition to government.  
 
The effects that this has had in terms of reducing numbers of peaceful protestors 
in fear of attack, further illustrates in a causal manner, the adverse longer term negative 
psychological and physical impacts that intolerance in the form of hostility against protesters 
has had upon deterring peaceful civic engagement. Accordingly, intolerance manifested via 
oppression as listed above, may thus be argued as attributable to having at least in part 
enabled a state of obstructed liberal freedoms including expression and demonstration, and 
access into the political process of citizenry regardless of race, ethnicity or in this case 
religion.   
 
 Insofar, religious intolerance, as reflected by the direct and 
longer term implications of those actions by part of government and Shia gangs, may thus be 
argued to be attributed to negatively impacting liberal democracy components calling for 
freedom of belief, opinion, assembly, and demonstration and likewise, access on equal basis 
to the political process regardless of race, ethnicity, or religion. 
 
 
5.3 Implications: Inequality in Education and Employment 
 
5.3.1 Education 
 
Evidence suggests that religious intolerance has also come to negatively effect 
education and employment. These two sectors are crucial components of liberal democracy 
calling for access on equal basis to education and employment(Stanford 2014). 
  
In terms of education, findings illustrate that religious intolerance between 
Sunnis and Shias has yielded inequality in higher education. This is illustrated by findings 
reflecting religious discrimination in universities across the country. This has first been made 
evident by findings relating to the effects of sectarian capture of higher education institutions. 
These include manipulation of curricula to suit sectarian agendas and likewise, 
implementation of student admittance policies on the basis of sectarian affiliation 
(Sawahel.2012)(Mamouri.2014).  
The second aspect reflecting religious intolerance in higher education relates to sectarian 
violence by where thousands of violent acts targeting students and staff in universities has 
been identified.  
Findings further suggested that the combined effects of these two factors above, have resulted 
in the “physicall” polarization of Universities along sectarian lines: Administrative 
discrimination has filtered sectarian composition of institutions which additionally, has been 
reinforced by displacement of students and staff resulting from insecurity produced by 
ongoing sectarian attacks upon learning centers (Sawahel.2012)(Ajeeli.2014). 
 
These two primary findings have negative implications upon equality in Iraqi 
higher education. Equality as ALA describes, includes equal access to sources of information 
that are, “..made available on even terms” (Kurnich.2014). The findings above directly reflect 
discrimination in education and likewise illustrate the longer term negative impact that 
discriminating administrative policies and sectarian attacks have had in enabling overall 
obstructed access to institutions as reflected by the homogenization of universities along 
sectarian lines (Sawahel.2012)(F.H.2013). 
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What these observations thus more broadly imply, is that religious intolerance in 
Iraq has to a greater or lesser extent, resulted in unequal access to higher education. This has 
been reflected by the intolerant nature and longer term effects of  acts of discrimination 
resulting form sectarian capture and violence, upon negatively altering the once diverse 
religious composition of Iraqi Universities (Sawahel.2012). 
Inequality in higher education in Iraq, may thus be argued as having at least in part  been a 
causal effect of religious intolerance and hence, a variable which has to a greater or lesser 
extent  negatively affected equal inclusion in Iraqi higher education since 2003. 
 
5.3.2 Employment 
 
Findings illustrate that inequality in employment has been produced as a product 
of religious intolerance as well. This is reflected by implementation of de-Baathification 
policies in 2003 which entailed systematic firing of Sunni employees from state institutions 
on the basis of direct or “suspected” connection to Saddams previous Baath party (FH.2014). 
This Shia government driven policy, effectively terminated employment positions most 
notably in the military, security forces, and in higher education on the basis of religious 
affiliation (FH.2014) (USDS.2010:8).  Likewise, evidence suggests that this has been 
accompanied by Shia favoritism in statal hiring (I.O.2013)(Sawahel.2012). This in the longer 
run has resulted in tens of thousands of Sunnis having lost their jobs and still up  to at least 
2013, have been restricted from attaining state employment as further reflected by the 
identification of  peaceful protests having in part been motivated by the former.(I.O 
2013)(UN 2013:3). 
 
As Equality Authority 2014 defines, Equality in employment is to entail equal 
employment opportunity regardless of an individual’s characteristics or orientations including 
gender, race, or religion (E.A.2014). De-bathification policies as a manifestation of 
intolerance oppose this and reflect discrimination toward access to employment on equal 
basis. Findings illustrate that discrimination in employment and hence inequality, has 
occurred on the basis of religious affiliation as Shia controlled government since 2003 has not 
only removed without due process thousands of Sunni state employees, but likewise findings 
suggest that this has been accompanied by Shia favoritism in hiring (FH.2014) 
(USDS.2010:8)(Sawahel.2012).  
Not only does the manifestation of intolerance via de-bathification policies directly reflect 
discrimination and obstruction of employment access on even grounds. Likewise the 
subsequent longer term effects of the former in that thousands of jobs have been lost pegged 
with Sunni protests having been motivated by this, illustrates the broader impact of these 
policies as responsible for enabling what may be more broadly regarded as a state of statal 
employment inequality in Iraq since 2003. 
 
Overall, observations in terms of the  religiously based nature of employment 
discrimination identified and subsequent longer term effects; thus leads to the assumption in 
that intolerance in Iraqi society has acted as a variable which to a greater or lesser extent, may 
be argued as causally having produced inequality in a portion of Iraq’s employment sector. 
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5.4 Implications: Inequality in the Political Landscape 
 
Findings indicate that religious intolerance at the political level, has manifested 
itself in a manner which negatively impacts liberal democracy in terms of government 
structure and functioning. Controversial actions in themselves by part of the executive 
reflecting religious discrimination, suggest contradiction of various liberal democracy 
components. The means taken toward and outcomes these actions, likewise have adverse 
effects upon liberal democracy components. 
 
Liberal democracy components calling for; equal access to the political process 
regardless of race ethnicity or religion, control of state and its decisions and allocations 
determined by elected officials, and constrained executive power by other autonomous 
powers such as parliament (Diamond 1999:11)., have been obstructed as reflected by the 
discriminating nature of controversial power centralizing moves taken by the executive.  
 
To begin with, findings have suggested that the executive has targeted, replaced, 
as well as purged without due process, an array of Sunni political members  since the 
governments inception in 2005 (ISW.2013). Three separate impacts upon liberal democracy 
components may be argued from these actions.  
First, the specific targeting and removal of Sunni´s from key political positions in itself and 
directly, suggests to a greater or lesser extent an obstruction in the ability for other groups (in 
this case Sunnis) to actively form part of, influence, and express interest in the political 
process. What may be argued to be observable here in other words, is the executive having 
obstructed equal access to the political process regardless of race, ethnicity or in this case 
religion. 
Secondly and dealing with the process taken in  the purging and replacement of Sunnis, is that 
the former has been found to have been executed without due process as reflected by findings 
suggesting the bypassing of parliament and Judiciary (BTI.2014:13). What this may be argued 
to reflect, is unconstrained executive power by where horizontal accountability in the process 
of removals and new appointments, is reflected to have been disregarded by the executive.  
 
  Lastly, the overall outcome effect of the above and as ISW describes, has 
allowed the executive to exert a degree of influence and control over statal bodies which 
otherwise and in accordance with the constitution, should be limited (ISW.2013). Again and 
similarly, this more generally, overall reflects an absence of horizontal accountability by part 
of the executive resulting in  unconstrained executive power in the political process and hence 
obstruction of a checks and balance system, otherwise crucially called upon by any 
institutional form of democracy.  
 
 Likewise related to having facilitated the purging and replacement of Sunni 
political figures, are findings suggesting extra constitutional establishment of security bodies 
sole by the executive. This importantly has been found to have enabled informal chains of 
command accountable only to the prime minister which further, has been suggested by BTI 
(2013), and ISW (2014) to have facilitated both the targeting and purging of Sunnis from the 
political landscape and, general Shia centralization of power (ISW.2013)(BTI.2014:6). 
Similar negative implications upon liberal democracy components as earlier argued, are 
similarly observable here.  
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First, this again implies lacking horizontal accountability and unconstrained 
executive power as reflected by non-adherence to due process in the creation and 
establishment of these security bodies. Likewise, this also implies non democratic 
institutional structure of these bodies, as member composition of the latter has not been 
determined democratically but rather sole by the executive (BTI.2014:6). Further and 
accordingly, this more broadly reflects an obstruction in the equal inclusion of other interest 
groups into the political process and subsequently and again, obstruction of an institutional 
checks and balances system. 
 
Overall what these findings suggest, are reserved power domains at the political 
level enabled by the executive which strongly contradicts a liberal democratic conception of 
government structure and functioning (Diamond.1999:10). Importantly, evidence has 
suggested that this has been enabled by the executives purging and replacements of Sunni 
political figures and likewise, by the extra-constitutional establishment of security bodies. 
 
These worrying occurrences at the political level have been found to have been 
adverse effects stemming from the religious conflict and more specifically resulting from the 
institutionalization of politics along religious and sectarian lines in Iraq.  
In sum, the manifestation of intolerance in Iraq’s political landscape as reflected by those  
controversial executive actions discussed above, directly reflect on obstruction of various 
liberal democracy components. Subsequent effects of these actions, has likewise been 
suggested to have had the profound impact of at least in part having shaped characteristics of 
Iraq’s political structure and functioning away from that which is in accordance with that of 
liberal democratic characteristics. 
In sum, religious intolerance may thus be argued to having at least in part acted as a variable 
obstructing of various liberal democracy components within the political landscape. 
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6. Concluding Theoretical Implications 
 
Arguments made above are closely in line with theory of democratic political 
culture. As earlier noted, this theory assumes a casual approach to mass and elite attitudes as 
conditioning behavior in society which is further argued (alongside proper institutions) as 
determining political performance and structure in a given setting (Diamond.1999:163). It 
suggests that cultural factors informing the above including tolerance for diversity, function 
as crucial variables toward the development and sustainability of democracy 
(Benavides.2011:11).  
Although this investigation has abstained from analyzing how lacking tolerance in Iraq may 
have prevented a process of democratization, It has nevertheless found, via behavioral 
findings which addressed attitudes between Sunnis and Shias, that intolerance to a greater or 
lesser extent has causally acted as a variable impacting liberal democracy components 
negatively. This has been observed in two distinct yet closely related ways: 
 
First, intolerance or intolerant attitudes have been observed by the 
discriminative characteristics of findings related to behavior between Sunnis and Shias. These 
Intolerant behavior patterns and actions observed suggesting discrimination, has been 
discussed as having direct negative implications upon liberal democracy components. In other 
words, the very direct nature of behavior as both a reflection and  manifestation of intolerant 
attitudes between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq, has been argued to resemble contradiction of 
various liberal democracy components.  
This generally, has been observed; with sectarian violence directly reflecting lacking cohesion 
and tolerance as well as an adverse form of cooperation and engagement. Secondly, with 
violence targeting peaceful Sunni protestors as a direct obstruction in freedom of speech and 
demonstration and likewise access to the political process on equal grounds. Thirdly, with de-
bathification policies directly reflecting discrimination in statal employment. Fourthly, with 
sectarian capture of universities and subsequent restructuring of policies, alongside sectarian 
violence targeting universities, directly reflecting discrimination toward access to education. 
And lastly, with the targeting and successful removal/replacement of Sunni political members 
without due process by the executive, directly reflecting unconstrained executive power and 
lacking adherence/respect toward access/inclusion of other interest groups in the political 
process on equal basis.  
What is observable here, is adverse non liberal democratic behavior. This may be interpreted, 
as both a reflection and likewise manifestation of intolerance or intolerant attitudes which at 
this early stage of the cause-effect sequence defended by democratic political culture theory; 
suggests an “early” contradiction of liberal democracy components. 
Secondly, the subsequent longer term effects of those intolerant behavior patterns listed 
above, have likewise been associated with negatively impacting liberal democracy 
components. This is suggested in a manner reflecting  at least partial obstruction of primarily 
political structure, away from that called upon by liberal democracy: 
 Structure here and in accordance with theory of democratic political culture, has at least in 
part been compromised  by intolerance, as discriminative behavior has ultimately been found 
to have; reinforced sectarian cooperation and violent engagement, deterred the ability to 
peacefully protest, obstructed equal access to higher education, produced unequal access to 
state employment, and obstructed both political process inclusion on equal basis, and likewise 
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general democratic functioning and structure of government. These effects, as a product of 
acts of discrimination found, strongly oppose liberal democracy requisites and further 
supports theory of democratic political culture in that tolerance or rather intolerance in the 
case of this study, has functioned as a variable causally negatively  impacting liberal 
democracy. 
 
The two core theoretical observations made above are further illustrated in the below figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
The implications of these findings and further in accordance with theory of 
democratic political culture, point in the way toward contradicting institutional theory: The 
establishment of a liberal democratic institutional structure in Iraq has alone, not lead to 
sustained liberal democracy as institutionalism otherwise posits. Upon identifying religious 
intolerance via acts of discrimination and long term effects, what has overall been found is a 
causal negative relationship between intolerance and the fulfillment of liberal democracy 
components or requisites. This is not to argue that liberal democracy has failed resulting from 
religious intolerance in Iraq however, evidence overall has illustrated a profound impact of 
the latter upon the former. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
In contesting Iraq’s lacking ability to attain liberal democracy, pegged with 
literature suggesting cultural impediments as having obstructed the former, this investigation 
departed with the aim of identifying and understanding the potential negative impact of 
intolerance in Iraqi society upon an understanding of liberal democracy. This first involved an 
exploration into Iraq’s religious conflict in which a prevalence of discrimination as an 
indicator of intolerance was identified within social and political landscapes of society. 
Intolerance within the countries broader religious conflict context identified, was reflected 
and discussed in the form of sectarian violence, hostility toward Sunni peaceful protest, 
discrimination in portions of education and employment, and within the political landscape in 
the form of Sunni targeting and centralization power by part of a Shia dominant executive. 
These acts reflecting intolerant attitudes and behavior between Sunnis and Shias, further 
suggested that the very nature and implications of these actions directly obstruct in various 
ways, components of liberal democracy. 
Longer term effects identified of discrimination as a manifestation of intolerance, further 
suggested that the former has been responsible for enabling facets in different sectors of 
society which strongly contradict a liberal conception and structure of democracy. These 
include sectarian cooperation and violent engagement, inequalities in access to education and 
employment, deterring peaceful protest, obstruction of political process inclusion on equal 
basis, and likewise obstruction of democratic functioning and structure of government. 
 
What has thus been overall observed, is a negative correlation between 
intolerance and liberal democracy in Iraq. In accordance with theory of democratic political 
culture, intolerance in Iraq has in this investigation, been causally attributed with having acted 
to a greater or lesser extent, as a variable obstructing liberal democracy components. This has 
been illustrated by the direct negative implications and effects upon liberal democracy 
components or requisites, resulting from a prevalence of discrimination between Sunnis and 
Shia Muslims as both a product and likewise a reflection of social intolerance in Iraq. 
 
 
 
8 Future Recommendations 
 
Toward future recommendation, and as a proponent of democratic political 
culture theory, I would like to motivate both researchers and foreign policy advisors alike, to 
take into serious account the role that cultural factors imbedded in a given populace´s 
attitudes and behaviors, may have toward obstructing a process of democratization. This may 
be especially valuable in emerging democracy contexts toward among other things; 
developing and implementing initiatives that asses and promote democratic attitudes and 
behavior. The potential negative impact of cultural aspects including social intolerance upon 
processes of democratization, as has been observed in this study, must not be underestimated. 
 
 
Word count 10,200 
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